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Rock the Cash-bah! How Alston Presents a
New Challenge to the Amateurism
Justification and Ways the NCAA Can
Modernize to Remain Afloat
John Y. Doty
During the last decade, antitrust litigation involving Division I
athletes and the NCAA has        
rules, presenting a threat to amateurism. As athletes have voiced
concerns about their likeness being used without permission in
video games, the difficulty of balancing sports and academics, and
going to bed hungry when millions of dollars in profits are being
made off of them, the NCAA has allowed conferences and schools
to provide student-athletes with stipends for cost of attendance
expenses. However, even though the NCAA has modified its rules,
athletes continue to ask for more, and courts have responded.
      
In March 2019, U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken declared that
the NCAA and its major conferences are violating antitrust law by
restricting the education related benefits athletes can receive. In
May 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
            
limit the non-cash education-related benefits available to athletes
in Division I of the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).
This Comment will discuss how antitrust litigation has impacted
               
decision in Alston, examine ways the NCAA can modernize to limit
athlete exploitation, and discuss how the NCAA and studentathletes can benefit from these solutions.
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INTRODUCTION

Picture a Saturday morning in Ann Arbor, Michigan in late-August
2003. The Michigan Wolverines, a top-ranked college football team, begin
their season against a middling Central Michigan team. In front of more
than one hundred thousand fans at its home stadium, Michigan wins the
game by nearly forty points. The stadium is filled with fans wearing maize
%& " %'$" % %$$"#)$!$'#at
in the house.
Take a moment to soak in the scene described above: because the
setting at many schools now differs significantly from what existed then.
Since 2003, the landscape and traditions of college athletics have changed
drastically. Notably, Division I athletes competing today are unhappy with
the benefits the NCAA is offering them. During the last decade, studentathletes have voiced concerns about the difficulty of balancing academics
and athletics, comparing it to balancing two full-time jobs.
   )   #$ !'"  "   %" $
1990s, sued the NCAA, alleging that the use of his likeness in DVDs,
video games, photographs, and apparel violated federal antitrust law.1
After the Ninth Circuit decided the lawsuit in 2015, the NCAA modified
its rules to allow schools to provide stipends to student-athletes for snacks,
student fees, movies, and more.2 However, those overtures by the NCAA
hardly addressed alleged antitrust violations and the dispute over pay for
name, image, and likeness remains largely unresolved.
This Comment will discuss how antitrust litigation has impacted
Division I athletics. Part II will review the history of the NCAA, discuss
its founding principles, and explain the standard of review for antitrust
ca##%"$"$"$ &#%##$ )#$"$ 
of amateurism and history of antitrust lawsuits. Finally, Part IV will
'( $ $ "%$)# #   Alston3 and discuss ways the
NCAA can modernize to limit athlete exploitation in a manner consistent
with the collegiate model.

1

Former Bruin OBannon sues NCAA, ESPN (July 21, 2009),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/story?id=4346470.
2
Chris Isidore, College athletes finally getting some cash, CNN (Sept. 4, 2015, 1:43
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/news/companies/extra-cash-collegeathletes/index.html.
3
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).
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HISTORY

The NCAA

In 1852, Harvard and Yale organized the first recorded intercollegiate
athletic event.4 By 1880, intercollegiate athletics began to assume the
commercial nature that is present today.5 Efforts to form conferences and
create rules began in the 1890s and continued through the beginning of the
twentieth century.6
In 1905, eighteen deaths and over one hundred injuries in
intercollegiate football spurred President Theodore Roosevelt to organize
a White House conference, where officials from major football programs
would meet to review football rules.7 Unfortunately, the conference did
little to lessen the toll of deaths and injuries among athletes in
intercollegiate football.8 However, a second meeting, organized by the
Chancellor of New York University, led to the creation of a Rules
Committee.9 Eventually, the Rules Committee and officials from the
White House worked together to reform the rules of intercollegiate
football.10 The group formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of
the United States, which was officially renamed the NCAA in 1910.11
Hindered by recruiting scandals, the NCAA enacted the Sanity Code
in 1948.12               
exploitative practices in the recruitment of student-    13 Within
three years, the Sanity Code was replaced by the Committee on
Infr                  
    14
     !       
1950s: (1) Walter Byers began his tenure as the Executive Director of the
NCAA; and (2) the NCAA negotiated a multi-million-dollar contract to
televise intercollegiate football.15 By 1952, Byers helped establish the

4
Cody J. McDavis, The Value of Amateurism, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275, 287
(2018).
5
Id. at 288.
6
Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Associations Death Penalty: How
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 990 (1987).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 991.
12
Id. at 992.
13
Id.
14
McDavis, supra note 4, at 290.
15
Smith, supra note 6, at 993.
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enforcement division of the NCAA.16 The division was formed to work in
tandem with the Committee on Infractions in the enforcement process.17
With the enforcement division and Infractions Committee working
!! 
'
role in the governance of intercollegiate athletics expanded.18 However, as

'  "  egan to speak up.19 Some asserted that
college athletics had commercialized to the point where it was a big
business disguising itself as an educational enterprise.20 Others criticized
the NCAA for enforcement regulations that were strict on some schools
but lenient on others.21 Moreover, legislators were critical of the NCAA.22
   !     
'
23
procedures and processes.
The NCAA revised its procedures in response to the investigation.24
However, even after amending its policies, the criticism persisted.25
     '  $  
convention in June 1985.26 !' 
shifted control over intercollegiate athletics by adopting legislation that
placed the Presidents and Chancellors of universities in control of the
NCAA.27 Today, the corporate structure of the NCAA mirrors the changes
' 28 The Board of Governors is
 % ! #&29 and consists of twenty-five members,
sixteen of whom are Presidents or Chancellors of universities across the
country.30 The NCAA President, the chairs of the Division I Council, and
the Division II and Division III management counsels are ex-facto
nonvoting members.31 Therefore, the sixteen Presidents and Chancellors

16

Id.
Id. at 994.
18
See McDavis, supra note 4, at 291.
19
See id.
20
Smith, supra note 6, at 994.
21
McDavis, supra note 4, at 291.
22
Id.
23
Smith, supra note 6, at 994.
24
McDavis, supra note 4, at 291.
25
Smith, supra note 6, at 994.
26
McDavis, supra note 4, at 291.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 293.
29
NCAA, Board of Governors, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/ncaaboard-governors (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
30
NCAA,
Board
of
Governors
Roster,
http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=EXEC
(last
visited Nov. 6, 2019).
31
Id.
17
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are the only members on the board who are allowed to vote on NCAA
legislation, with the exception that the President may vote to break a tie.32

B.

Amateurism and Founding Principles

             !  
  !     33 The lack of a common
understanding of what it meant to be a student-athlete troubled
intercollegiate athletics in the years prior to the formation of the NCAA
and continued to be problematic for years after.34 If fair competition was
ever going to be achieved, the NCAA needed to establish limits on who
could participate in intercollegiate athletics. It is through amateurism that
the NCAA created these limits.35
  "   
in part to prevent participation by non-amateurs, a clear definition of
 !    36 The need to establish a
definition prompted the NCAA to establish a committee to define the
term.37 In 1909, the NCAA became the first to affirmatively define an
        art in athletic contests
purely in obedience to play impulses or for the satisfaction of purely play
motives and for the exercise, training, and social pleasure derived. The
         !38 Since
the beginning of the twentieth century, this definition has evolved but the
      -athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily
by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived.
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
  !39
Today, the troubling situations with amateurism arise when the NCAA
relies on it to justify rules limiting student- "  
Under these circumstances, the NCAA profits from the sale of
merchandise, tickets, advertising, and corporate sponsorships, and uses
amateurism to preclude student-athletes from obtaining benefits. Courts
32

Id.
Smith, supra note 6, at 991.
34
See HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 83, 87 (1929) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
35
McDavis, supra note 4, at 294.
36
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 34, at 42.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2, 2.9, at 4 (Aug. 1, 2019) [hereinafter NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL].
33
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analyze challenges to amateurism under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
                
amateurism has been challenged through the Sherman Antitrust Act.

C.

Antitrust Framework

The primary authority under which student-athletes bring claims
against the NCAA for restricting athlete pay is the Sherman Antitrust
Act.40 To prevail on a claim under Section 1, a student-athlete must show
(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy, (2) that the agreement
restrained trade unreasonably, and (3) that the restraint affected interstate
commerce.41 In claims against the NCAA, student-athletes typically
establish the first and third prongs easily.42 The NCAA rules prohibiting
student-athletes from receiving compensation are codified in the NCAA
Manual, satisfying the first prong.43 In addition, interstate commerce is
affected. The NCAA is a nationally operating enterprise with member
institutions operating in every state of the country.44 Because of this,
claims are often decided on the second prong: whether the agreement
unreasonably restrained trade. Courts analyze the question under one of
the following tests or rules: (1) the per se rule, (2) the rule of reason, or (3)
the quick look analysis.45

1. The Per Se Rule
Courts apply the per se rule when entities engage in practices that are
presumptively illegal.46 Applying the per se rule analysis, courts have held
practices such as price-fixing47, output limitations48, and division of
markets  all of which are presumptively illegal  to be antitrust
violations.49
Althoug         
per se rule analysis, the Supreme Court has never allowed it. 50 To exist at
40

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (Every contract, combination, in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.).
41
Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991).
42
McDavis, supra note 4, at 299.
43
Id.
44
McDavis, supra note 4, at 299-300.
45
McDavis, supra note 4, at 300.
46
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches
to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 691 (1991).
47
U.S. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956).
48
U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972).
49
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990).
50
See Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1974).
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all, the NCAA must create and enforce rules defining, and in some cases,
restraining the manner in which institutions compete.51 Therefore, the
            
  52

2. The Rule of Reason
The rule of reason is the main framework that courts apply when
analyzing student-     e NCAA.53 Under the
                     
relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or
incentive profitability to raise price above or reduce output, quality,
service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the absence of
      54 A burden shifting framework applies.55
First, the student-athlete must establish that the restraint creates
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.56 Market power of the
defendant in the relevant market usually also must be shown, however, it
is not required where an unambiguous detrimental effect on price or output

exists.57      
an adverse effect on price, output, consumer choice, or quality.58 Product
and geographic markets are considered in determining whether a market
is relevant.59           
that have reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of
 60 The geographic market incorporates the area of effective
competition where buyers can look to for alternate sources of supply.61
If the student-athlete establishes significant anticompetitive effects in
a relevant market, the burden shifts to the NCAA to show that the restraint

51

Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 103.
53
See McDavis, supra note 4, at 300.
54
FTC & DOJ, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4
(2000).
55
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126,
1135-36 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
56
Id. at 1136.
57
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109.
58
See
Anticompetitive
Practices,
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices.
59
Oltz v. St. Peters Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988); see Big Bear
Lodging Assn v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999).
60
Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446; see, e.g., Law v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 134 F.3d
1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the product made available by the NCAA in the
case is college basketball).
61
Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446.
52
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        $62 Thereafter, the NCAA
must show that although it has imposed restraints, the procompetitive
justification outweighs the anticompetitive harm.63 If the NCAA makes
this showing, the burden shifts back to the student-athlete to establish that
 &      "    64
    #  "   $  
without significantly greater costs.65 If at any point, a party cannot meet
its burden, it will lose.66

3. The Quick Look Analysis
The quick look analysis is an abbreviated version of the rule of reason
analysis.       , the Supreme Court gave its seal of
approval to the quick look analysis.67 The California Dental Association
#$ !   -profit organization with nearly 20,000 member
dentists, and it had a code of ethics prohibiting false advertising with
respect to price and quality of service.68 The Federal Trade Commission
# $            ! 
problematic but that as implemented, CDA prohibited any advertising of
discounts and any advertising with respect to quality of services, and
concluded that restrictions on both price advertising and non-price
advertising would be unlawful under a quick look analysis.69 Ultimately,
the Court agreed, concluding that this case and its predecessors opened the
#!        % &  "
     $70 However, the Court merely endorsed the
% &  !s language; it declined to apply the analysis
in this case. Specifying when this type of analysis is appropriate, the Court
              ! # 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive

62

In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126,
1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
63
McDavis, supra note 4, at 301.
64
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
65
O&Bannon v. Nat&l Collegiate Athletic Ass&n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015)
(citing Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
66
McDavis, supra note 4, at 301.
67
Cal. Dental Ass&n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999).
68
Id. at 759-60.
69
Id. at 762-63.
70
See id. at 770.
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 71       
of Regents is the first antitrust case where the Court applied this analysis. 72
Significantly, the quick look analysis is distinct from the rule of reason
because it allows a court to short-circuit the market power inquiry in some
cases. Market power is frequently one of the most difficult issues to
resolve in antitrust cases and is typically the subject of expert testimony.
Supporters of the quick look rule view it as an improvement over
traditional rule of reason analysis for many reasons: (1) it facilitates
deterrence by encouraging lawsuits that might otherwise be intimidated by
the burdens of a rule of reason analysis; (2) it reduces litigation costs; and
(3) it encourages cost savings without preventing defendants from
presenting justifications for their conduct.73

III.
A.

NCAA ANTITRUST LAWSUITS

History

In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Board of Regents. Supporters of
amateurism rules assert that the case stands for the proposition that
student-athletes should not be compensated.74 Surprisingly, the NCAA has
relied on this decision most in defending its amateurism rules, even though
the antitrust challenge in the case had nothing to do with amateurism.
In Board of Regents, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia sued
the NCAA, alleging that its television plan, which limited the number of
times a member institution could appear on air, violated antitrust law.75
The NCAA adopted its first restrictive television policy in 1951, after a
         
attendance and unless brought under some control threatens to seriously
ha        76 In 1979, after
71

Id.
In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens commented that the quick look can sometimes
be applied in the twinkling of an eye. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1974).
73
Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust
Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 837 (2016).
74
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. (In order to preserve the character and quality of
[college football], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the
like.); Ben Strauss, 30-Year-Old Decision Could Serve as Template for N.C.A.A. Antitrust
TIMES
(June
30,
2014),
Case,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/sports/ncaabasketball/30-year-old-decision-couldserve-as-template-for-ncaa-antitrust-case.html (The fundamental premise of the case, as
has been cited a number of times, is that student-athletes should not be paid.).
75
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 92-94.
76
Id. at 99 (citing the NCAA Television Committee Report).
72
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member institutions began negotiating their own agreements, the NCAA
announced that it would take disciplinary action against any member that
entered into a separate agreement.77 The universities sued the NCAA.78
In antitrust terms, the television restrictions were both a horizontal
agreement not to compete and a limitation on output.79 In normal
circumstances, these would be per se unlawful.80 However, since they
were the product of NCAA rule-making, the Court indicated that the rule
of reason was the proper mode of analysis.81 The issue was whether the
television restriction had a negative effect in the market for televised
collegiate athletics.82 If the restraint had a negative effect in the relevant
market, then the plan violated antitrust law.83 The universities met their
burden of establishing significant anticompetitive effects in a relevant
market.84 The television agreement restricted their ability to sell television
rights in the market of college football broadcasts, making the prices they
could receive for television rights lower and the output lower than it might
have been in a free market.85 The burden then shifted to the NCAA, which
asserted the procompetitive effects of live, televised games, and
competitive balance.86 Since the NCAA did not rely on these effects in
trying to justify restraints on college basketball telecasts, the Court did not
agree they were legitimate, and found in favor of the universities.87
Even though the Court ruled for the universities in Board of Regents,
 $     
  $    
tradition of amateurism in college athletics and it can impose restrictions
to protect amateurism.88    "
role of the NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise
#89 "     ! e
sports], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the
#90    $   Board of Regents can be
understood to support the proposition that even though amateurism is not
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 94-95.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 103.
See id. at 95.
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 105-07, 112-13.
Id. at 117.
Id.
See id. at 102, 120.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 102.
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perfect, it is a reasonable justification for some restrictions as long as the
restrictions further educational objectives of the organization and its
purpose of preserving the character and quality of intercollegiate
athletics.91 However, most court decisions that have defended amateurism
 % -$&%! !%'$$&$%%! $!##$%# %$#*
on Board of Regents&$%' $- &($%!'# 
then every case upon which the NCAA relied on the language to uphold
amateurism based restrictions would be contested.92 The Northern District
of California dealt with this issue in  
 .

B.

 

 &*   - !   !## $% "*# !#  
filed suit against the NCAA.93 Recognizing that his image was being used
in a video g !# (  ($ !%   !" $% - ! 
argued that the NCAA violated antitrust law by forbidding student-athletes
from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and likeness
in broadcasts.94 - !   %% %   ) %e amount
student-athletes are paid for their name, image, and likeness at zero and
prohibited student-athletes from accessing the market.95 He sought to
restrain the NCAA from creating and enforcing rules that restrict Division
I football and basketball pl*#$- %* %! #' + * !" $%! 
beyond the value of their athletic scholarships for the use of their names,
images, and likeness in videogames, live game telecasts, re-broadcasts,
 #'!!%,96
As with most antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA,  
would
turn on the second prong of the Sherman Act, whether the agreement
restrained trade unreasonably.97 At trial, the plaintiffs met their burden of
showing that the NCAA created significant anticompetitive effects in a
relevant market.98 The burden then shifted to the NCAA to show that the

91

McDavis, supra note 4, at 307.
Id. at 308.
93
O-Bannon v. Nat-l Collegiate Athletic Ass-n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
94
Steve Elder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O Bannon s Suit Against the N.C.A.A.,
TIMES
(June
9,
2014),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannonssuit-against-the-ncaa.html.
95
Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2013 WL 3810438, at 14, (N.D.
Cal. July 19, 2013).
96
O Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.
97
McDavis, supra note 4, at 310.
98
O Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
92
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compensation restrictions were justified.99 Although noting faulty
reasoning in many of its arguments,100 the court ultimately found that the
NCAA met its burden through two justifications: amateurism and the
integration of academics and athletics.101 Thus, the burden shifted back to
the plaintiffs to establish that these justifications could be accomplished
through a less restrictive means.102
The plaintiffs identified two legitimate less restrictive alternative
measures: (1) permit schools to allow scholarships to cover the full cost of
attendance at any Division I school; and (2) allow schools to hold limited
and equal shares of licensing revenues in a trust to be distributed to athletes
after their eligibility is up. 103 The court found that these were reasonable
alternative measures and that the practice of prohibiting payments to
athletes violated antitrust law.104 However, for the second alternative, the
court noted that the NCAA could still cap name, image, and likeness trusts
at $5,000 per year.105 The court highlighted that NCAA broadcast expert
       
athletes since consumers would continue to patronize intercollegiate
athletics even if athletes were paid that amount.106
In September 2015, the Ninth Circuit heard the case. On appeal, the
NCAA relied on Board of Regents, arguing that the decision established
          107 However, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the decision only discussed amateurism rules
in the context of the rule of reason, as an important factor distinguishing
the market for collegiate athletics from the market for professional
athletics, and noted that the television restrictions challenged in Board of
Regents had nothing to do with amateurism.108. Therefore, the language in
Board of Regents regarding amateurism is dicta that will be given
      109
99

Id.
The NCAA relied on Board of Regents to argue that its compensation restrictions
promote consumer demand by preserving its tradition of amateurism and identity of college
sports. However, the court rejected the argument and found that the Board of Regents
language stating that student-athletes cannot be paid did not serve to resolve any disputed
issues of law in the case and was not based on any factual findings. The court decided
that Stevens! language was an incidental phrase that did not establish compensation
restrictions as procompetitive. Id. at 999-1000.
101
Id. at 1004.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1005.
104
See id. at 983-84.
105
Id. at 1008.
106
Id. at 983.
107
O!Bannon v. Nat!l Collegiate Athletic Ass!n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015).
108
Id. (citing Nat!l Collegiate Athletic Ass!n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
109
Id.
100
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 #  " (
regarding the justifications.110 The restrictions on compensation play a role
in integrating academics with athletics and preserving consumer demand
by promoting amateurism.111 !   # (
less restrictive alternatives, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily  !(
contention in Board of Regents    ' 
  (     112 Affording the NCAA that
           #  % ! #
"&      !  %! #  !& 
!          #   (  
burden.113
On the first alternative to restricting compensation $ allowing schools
to offer full cost of attendance scholarships $ the Ninth Circuit held that
the plaintiffs met their burden.114 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
  (        #  -in-aid
violated antitrust law.115 As for the other alternative $ paying athletes cash
compensation and holding licensing revenues in a trust to be distributed to
athletes after their eligibility is up $ the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court.116 Referring to the ample latitude the NCAA must be afforded, the
      %     ason requires that the NCAA
permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their student
 &117
Judge Thomas, the Chief Judge for the Ninth Circuit, dissented with
  #(      #   to $5,000 in deferred
compensation above student- (    
allowed.118 Thomas argued that the majority erred in dismissing the
testimony of Neal Pilson, who stated that paying student-athletes $5,000
per year in a trust would not significantly impact consumer demand, and
of Dr. Daniel Rascher, who testified that consumer demand in rugby,
   #     ( !  
allowed athletes to be paid.119 Importantly, Thomas asserted that %

110

Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1073.
112
Id. at 1074 (citing Nat(l Collegiate Athletic Ass(n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984)).
113
Id. at 1074, 1076.
114
Id. at 1075-76.
115
Id.
116
See id. at 1076.
117
Id. at 1079.
118
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting in part)
119
Id. at 1080-81.
111
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of antitrust analysis, the concept of amateurism is relevant only insofar as
        120
The decision in  established two important principles. First,
student-athletes are allowed to receive compensation equal to the cost of
attendance at their respective institution.121 Second, Board of Regents does
not give the NCAA point blank authority to enforce compensation
restrictions and justify them with amateurism.122 As Judge Thomas
implied in the dissent, amateurism is a relevant inquiry only to the extent
that it impacts consumer interest.123 Thus, it is only an appropriate
       !     
benefits to athletes would ruin consumer demand.124 As we will see, Judge
Thomas had an opportunity to vindicate this view in Alston.   is
still critical to law on athlete compensation today. However, a landmark
decision in March 2019 by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in May 2020, reaffirmed the proposition that
 !    -in-aid or scholarships that schools
offer athletes constitute a restraint on trade.125 The next section discusses
            -in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litigation (Alston)126 and its implications on athlete compensation in
collegiate athletics.

C.

Alston

Since  , several Division I athletes have challenged the
compensation restrictions that the NCAA relies on to protect amateurism.
In Alston, the lead plaintiffs, Shawne Alston, a former West Virginia

              !   
            !      athlete compensation, creating a free market where conferences have the
option to offer compensation packages to recruits.127 Observing that the
120

Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1074.
122
Id. at 1061.
123
See Id.
124
See id.
125
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
126
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375
F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
127
John Wolohan, A further anti-trust challenge to the NCAAs athlete compensation cap
(In Re: NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap..), LAWINSPORT (April 11, 2019),
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/a-further-anti-trust-challenge-to-the-ncaa-sathlete-compensation-cap-in-re-ncaa-athletic-grant-in-aid-cap#references.
121
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allegations made by the plaintiffs were nearly identical to the allegations
 & ' "  $ " !!! "  #  "
doctrine of stare decisis.128 Judge Claudia Wilken, who presided in the
district court in   and made the initial decision of allowing cash
&"!"""!" '!"129
"  " # "  " '! " "  "! $  
summary judgment.130 As in   " '! " %!
premised on amateurism being significant to consumer appeal for
collegiate athletics and the NCAA being afforded ample latitude to protect
it.131 The motion was denied.132  "!  # "" " '!
approach to restricting financial aid was inconsistent: in some cases, aid
was limited to the cost of attendance.133 In others, aid exceeded the cost of
attendance.134 Thus, the restrictions were restraints that create unjustified
anticompetitive effects.135 In response, the NCAA asserted the two
justifications that survived in  : integration of academics and
athletics136 and preservation of consumer demand for the product by

128

Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof, In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14MD02541, 2016 WL 4943915 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
129
Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,   Nat'("""
Ass'("" "-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-2541-CW, 2016 WL 4154855
(N.D. Cal. 2016).
130
Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgement; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof,   Nat'(" ""(!!'(""
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md02541 CW).; Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for
Exclusion of Expert Testimony, and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, In
 Nat'("""(!!'("" "-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp.
3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md-02541 CW).
131
Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for Exclusion
of Expert Testimony, and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 39-(   NCAA Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No.
14-md-02541 CW).
132
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross- "! # & #"(In
 Nat'("""(!!'("" "-in-"" #!" "(   NCAA
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(No. 14-md-02541 CW).
133
See Id. at *9.
134
Id.
135
Id. at *7.
136
  "   "! #!""( & #!"" ""
survived
was
preservation
of
consume  (
 Nat'("
""(!!'("" "-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1249 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2020).
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promoting amateurism.137 The court found a factual dispute and held that
these justifications would have to be proved at trial.138
Responding to the justifications, the plaintiffs offered two less
restrictive alternatives: (1) allow conferences to set rules for education and
athletic participation expenses that member institutions can provide; and
(2) eliminate all rules prohibiting payments of any kind related to
educational expenses and payments that are incidental to athletic
participation.139           
a rule of reason analysis.140 Having identified the relevant market of
Division I intercollegiate athletics, the court established that the NCAA
and its member schools effectively have monopsony power to restrain
          141
The NCAA wields monopsony power because college football and
basketball lack elite viable alternative competitions.142 To attend college
             
compensation rules, regardless of whether the rules accurately reflect the
competitive value of their services.143 Thus, the plaintiffs established
significant anticompetitive effects in a relevant market.144
The burden then shifted to the NCAA to provide legitimate
procompetitive justifications for the restraint.145 The NCAA argued that
the restraint was justified since amateurism remains significant to the
consumer demand for college athletics.146 Specifically, if student-athletes
were not amateurs, attendance at games, TV ratings, and revenues would
drop.147 In support of the justification, the NCAA contended that
consumers enjoy college sports because they are an alternative form of
entertainment to professional sports, and that the levels of competition
differ due to the amounts and types of compensation players receive.148
The court, however, found that the distinction between college and
professional sports primarily lies in college athletes not receiving

137

Alston, 2018 WL 1524005, at *8.
Id. (citing OBannon v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir.
2015)).
139
Id. at *12-13.
140
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
141
Id. at 1070.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
See Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1082.
138
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unlimited cash payments, especially those unrelated to education
expenses.149
                  
may have an effect on preserving consumer demand for college sports as
distinct from professional sports to the extent that they prevent unlimited
cash payments unrelated to education expenses.150 The challenged
compensation limits can be divided into three categories: (1) the limit on
the grant-in-aid at not less than the cost of attendance; (2) compensation
and benefits unrelated to education paid on top of a grant-in-aid; and (3)
compensation and benefits related to education provided on top of a grantin-aid.151 The court found that the limits in the first and second categories
have a procompetitive effect related to having limits, and help maintain
consumer demand for intercollegiate athletics as a distinct product by
preventing cash payments unrelated to education.152 As for the third
            its on benefits related to
education (e.g., scholarships for graduate programs) do not have an effect
on enhancing consumer demand for college sports.153
The burden then shifted back to the plaintiffs to show that the
justifications could be accomplished through a substantially less restrictive
means.154 The plaintiffs proposed the alternative of eliminating all rules
prohibiting payments of any kind related to educational expenses and
payments that are incidental to athletic participation.155 In finding this
alternative to be less restrictive, the court held that providing additional
education-related benefits would be less harmful to competition in the
relevant market.156 Specifically, the types of benefits that should not be
              
musical instruments, and other items not currently included in the cost of
attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of various
 -eligibility
      157      
scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at any school;
scholarships to attend vocational school; expenses for pre- and posteligibility tutoring; expenses related to studying abroad that are not
covered by the cost of attendance; and paid post-   158
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id. at 1086.
Id.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1088.
Id.
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The court found that the alternative rules would only expand educationrelated compensation and benefits, without resulting in cash payments,
unrelated to education, like payments in professional sports.159 In addition,
the NCAA would still have the right to define the education-related
benefits and create rules on how schools provide them to athletes.160
On May 18, 2020, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
 &          
 $-cash education-related %  
of the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).161 Judge Thomas, who dissented
! #&that payments of up to $5,000
in deferred compensation above student- &  
are not permissible, wrote for the panel.162
The panel reviewed the less restrictive alternative identified by the
district court163 and found that the court did not err in determining that it
! $  #  %  
  &         !    
negative effect on consumer demand.164 In reaching this conclusion, the
     &     & #
about a University of Nebraska program that permits student-athletes to
receive up to $7,500 in post-eligibility aid (for study-abroad expenses,
scholarships, and intern !   #&   
conceded did not erode demand, the expansion of SAF and AEF payments,
and a Student-&  # !      !
continue to patronize college sports even if student-athletes received
academic or graduation incentive payments of up to $10,000.165 Keeping
these expansions of benefits in mind, the panel concluded that the district
 #  &   
only to the extent that they prevent unlimited cash payments akin to
professional salaries.166
   & # " 
&  !   #
159

Id. at 1088-89.
Wolohan, supra note 127.
161
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).
162
Id. at 1242.
163
The less restrictive alternative $would prohibit the NCAA from (i) capping certain
education-related benefits and (ii) limiting academic or graduation awards or benefits
below the maximum amount that an individual may receive in athletic participation awards,
while (iii) permitting individual conferences to set limits on education-related benefits.%
Id. at 1260 (citing Alston, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1087).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1250.
166
Id. at 1260.
160
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manner, rather than limiting the options to education-related expenses.167
       %
reaching its conclusion on this matter, the panel discussed the Fair Pay for
Play Act, enacted in California in 2019.168 The law will go into effect in
January 2023, and allows college athletes in California to be paid for use
of their name, image, and likeness.169 The plaintiffs argued that the
%        
invalidates the argument that benefits would diminish the amateurism
model, and therefore the NCAA, in prohibiting pure cash compensation,
can no longer rely on  conclusion that limits on cash payments
untethered to education are critical to preserving consumer demand.170
However, the panel sa  # $ #
     $171
    %
student-athletes in Alston, many argue the decision is a victory for the
NCAA since a free-    %      
established. However, in concluding that some pure cash payments for
non-education reasons and payments to athletes for products and services
used for education beyond the cost of attendance would not erode
consumer demand, the panel did what the Ninth Circuit in 
prohibited. The next section analyzes this decision.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit Properly Decided Alston

  %     -athletes were the
losers in Alston since it did not create a free market for their services.
However, student-athletes still benefitted from Alston since the Ninth
Circuit exceeded what it disallowed in . Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that SAF and AEF payments and other above cost of
attendance payments,172  # !$
167

See id. at 1265.
Id. at 1252.
169
See id.
170
Id. at 1265.
171
Id.
172
#Without losing their eligibility, student-athletes may receive, for instance: (i) awards
valued at several hundred dollars for athletic performance (#athletic participation
awards$) . . . (ii) disbursements"sometimes thousands of dollars"from the NCAA%s
Student Assistance Fund (#SAF$) and Academic Enhancement Fund (#AEF$) for a variety
of purposes, such as academic achievement or graduation awards, school supplies, tutoring,
study-abroad expenses, post-eligibility financial aid, health and safety expenses, clothing,
168
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standard. Relying on expert testimony and distinguishing these payments
from professional salaries, the Court concluded that they would not
negatively impact consumer demand, and therefore are permissible in
intercollegiate athletics.173 For the following reasons, the Ninth Circuit
   #

1. Student-#  
Even though Alston     #
rights and the benefits afforded to them continue to grow. Some of the
ways conferences and the NCAA have modified rules after  and
Alston are detailed below.

a.
Now

Athletic Scholarships Receive Greater Protection

Although the NCAA does not require schools to offer guaranteed
multi-year scholarships to athletes, the practice of offering four-year
scholarships is more common now than it was before  and
Alston.174 After , the NCAA Div!" 
and Notre Dame implemented a rule that precludes student-athletes from
having their athletic scholarships terminated or not renewed for any
athletics reason.175 Even though non-Power Five schools are not required
to follow this rule, its implementation was significant for reasons including
over-signing at powerhouse Division I football programs. Over-signing
occurs when college athletic departments sign more prospective studentathletes to National Letters of Intent than the maximum number of

travel, !personal or family expenses," loss-of-value insurance policies, car repair, personal
legal services, parking tickets, and magazine subscriptions . . . (iv) mandatory medical care
(available for at least two years after the athlete graduates) for an athletics-related injury
. . . ." Id. at 1244-45.
173
Id. at 1260.
174
See Jon Solomon, Schools can give out 4-year athletic scholarships, but many dont,
CBS SPORTS (Sep. 16, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schoolscan-give-out-4-year-athletic-scholarships-but-many-dont/.
175
Termination or non-renewal of an athletic scholarship is allowed if an athlete (1) is
ruled ineligible for competition, (2) provides fraudulent information on an application,
letter of intent, or financial aid agreement, (3) voluntarily quits their team, (4) engages in
serious misconduct that rises to the level of being disciplined by the university#s regular
student disciplinary board, or (5) violates a university policy or rule which is not related to
athletic conditions or ability, but a coach cannot take away an athlete#s scholarship for poor
athletic performance. Rick Allen, The Facts About Guaranteed Multi-Year NCAA DI
Scholarships, INFORMED ATHLETE (June 12, 2016), https://informedathlete.com/the-factsabout-guaranteed-multi-year-ncaa-di-scholarships/.
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scholarships permitted by NCAA rules.176 It typically occurs in two ways:
a school could sign a number of National Letters of Intent that may bring
its total number of counters177 above the NCAA limit of eighty-five; or a
school could sign more than twenty-five National Letters of Intent during
the period between National Signing Day and May 31.178
This rule enhancing the protection of athletic scholarships prevents
unfair practices like over-signing since a coach cannot terminate or fail to
renew an athletic scholarship for underperformance or medical reasons.
Therefore, a coach is not incentivized to sign more players than he or she
is permitted by NCAA rules. Although the rule does not guarantee athlete
pay, it provides athletes with protection         
.

b.
Alston Could Motivate Student-Athletes to Pursue
Graduate Degrees
   Alston represents a significant increase
in student-      t
benefits student-athletes are allowed to receive as long as they are related
to education.179 Although the NCAA would be permitted to create rules
defining the benefits student-athletes can receive and how they can receive
them, within the category of types of benefits that can no longer be limited
                    
attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic
  180 The language is open-ended and depending on interpretation,
could result in massive increases in benefits to athletes.
Second, student-athletes are now entitled to post-eligibility
scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at any school
and scholarships to attend vocational school.181 Due to the time
commitment required, costs, and difficulty of obtaining a graduate degree
relative to an undergraduate degree, it is fair to assume that in the past, few
student-athletes would have opted to pursue a graduate degree without
176

See Timothy Threadcraft, Oversigning: The unexamined immoraility of the SEC,
YALE NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2011/11/16/oversigning-theunexamined-immorality-of-the-sec/.
177
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 39, art. 15.02.3, at 202 (A counter is an
individual who is receiving institutional financial aid that is countable against the aid
limitations in the sport.).
178
See Threadcraft, supra note 176.
179
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1252 (9th Cir. 2020).
180
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
181
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d at 1251.
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financial aid. With scholarship money on the table now, more could opt to
pursue graduate degrees in the future. Given that Alston increases the
education benefits and money available to athletes, it continues to expand
the benefits that they can receive.

2. Inequity of Illegal Restraints of Trade
In Alston, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding in that the
          
an illegal price-fixing agreement in restraint of trade.182 However, the
      
            
      183
Price-fixing occurs when competitors agree to raise, lower, or stabilize
prices or competitive terms.184 Since customers choose what products and
services to buy, and expect prices to be determined freely on the basis of
supply and demand (not competitively fixed), antitrust law generally
requires that companies establish prices and other terms on their own,
without agreeing with competitors.185 Applying this idea to college
athletics, horizontal price fixing occurs if conferences and schools agree
to not pay athletes with the understanding that it would lead to fairness and
competitiveness across the board.186 Considering that the NCAA is a
conglomerate of horizontal competitors and it caps the benefits athletes
receive for participating in sports, there is no dispute that the NCAA
engages in price-fixing. However, because of the degree of cooperation
     ucture, courts have never subjected scholarship
agreements to a per se analysis.187            
affirmation of  and recognition of the illegality of scholarship
agreements in Alston is significant. Certainly, Alston stuck to the guns of
earlier decisions, distinguishing the legality of awards such as Pell Grants,
which are intended for education-related expenses, from pure cash

182
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1254 (9th Cir. 2020).
183
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375
F. Supp. at 1066.
184
Price Fixing, FED. TRADE COMM N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing.
185
Id.
186
Hayes Rule, A breakdown of Alston v. NCAA: What is the future of paying college
athletes, and what would it mean for athletes to be paid? THE BEARFACED TRUTH (May 4,
2019), https://medium.com/the-bearfaced-truth/a-breakdown-of-alston-v-ncaa-what-isthe-future-of-paying-college-athletes-3483569905b4.
187
See In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
375 F. Supp. at 1066.
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compensation.188 However, the recognition of the inequity of scholarship
agreements by the  and Alston courts indicates that this issue is
on the horizon. Although the modification of scholarship agreements will
have to occur within the confines of recent decisions, the recognition of
these issues suggests that this may be the first of many incremental
 $

3. Additional Changes Coming?
As student-athletes benefitted from Alston in the ways discussed in
this section, the NCAA, which consistently contends that student-athlete
compensation will destroy consumer demand for its product, benefitted in
          $  
incorporate unlimited cash payments to student-athletes. In its review of
  $   Alston, the Ninth Circuit may not have
necessarily felt that allowing athlete pay for name, image, and likeness
would destroy consumer demand. However, there are still hurdles that
student-athletes must overcome before a free market can be properly
 $
Although name, image, and likeness pay does not yet fit into the
$   ! 
1984, Justice Stevens opined in Board of Regents that the NCAA should
"#189 and that
"    #190 Although the Court ruled against the
NCAA, the NCAA has incessantly relied on this dictum over the years in
arguing that restraints should be allowed to protect consumer demand. In
     $
in    !     $  
Board of Regents is only applicable in specific instances and permitted
universities to offer athletes cost of attendance scholarships.191 In Alston,
the panel upheld  and eliminated the cap on education-related
benefits to athletes.192 Recently, the NCAA President and Board of
Governors appointed a task force to examine issues highlighted in recently
proposed federal and state legislation related to student-athlete name,

188
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1255 (9th Cir. 2020).
189
Nat$l Collegiate Athletic Ass$n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
190
Id. at 102.
191
See O$Bannon v. Nat$l Collegiate Athletic Ass$n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1000-01 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
192
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d at 1240.
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image, and likeness.193 With courts becoming more lenient in affording
benefits to student-athletes, and the NCAA beginning to examine how
name, image, and likeness pay can properly fit into its model, courts and
state legislatures may ultimately determine payments of this type should
be permitted, and significant change may be forthcoming.
   %Alston strikes the
best possible balance between the financial and educational interests of all
parties. Eliminating the cap on education-related benefits continues
expanding benefits available to athletes while maintaining the consumer
  
%    "! " #
continuing to present evidence that payments to athletes of higher value
would not substantially impact consumer demand, and states beginning to
establish legislation for athlete pay, it may only be a matter of time before
things change for good. The next section discusses what Alston could
mean in the future, considers long-term solutions to restraints on studentathlete compensation, and analyzes issues which ultimately will require
change to be incremental.

B.

Application & Long-Term Solutions

   %  Alston, universities, if permitted
by their conferences, can provide student-athletes with benefits that further
their education, such as computers and other devices.194 However, the
Ninth Circuit and courts across the country have not yet allowed athletes
to receive name, image, and likeness pay.195
As discussed in the previous section,  and Alston represent
an increase in student-%        
cases, student-$"!$"%
     
%  ! 
voted unanimously to allow student-athletes the opportunity to benefit
from the use of their name, image, and likeness in a manner consistent
with the collegiate model, and the NCAA appointed a task force to
examine name, image, and likeness pay.196 Specifically, Michael Drake,

193

Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Working Group to Examine Name, Image, and
Likeness, NCAA (May 14, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-working-group-examine-name-image-and-likeness.
194
In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d at 1251.
195
See id. at 1265.
196
Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image, and likeness
opportunities,
NCAA
(Oct.
29,
2019,
1:08
PM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-starts-processenhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities.
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the Chair of the Board of Governors and President of The Ohio State
University, said:
             
experience for college athletes. Additional flexibility in
this area can and must continue to support college sports
as a part of higher education. This modernization for the
future is a natural extension of the numerous steps NCAA
members have taken in recent years to improve support
for
student-athletes,
including
full
cost
of
197
attendance and      
The Board asserted that the modernization of collegiate athletics
would have to occur within a specific set of principles and guidelines. 198
Because of the  and Alston decisions, the number of antitrust
lawsuits that continue to be brought against the NCAA, and complaints of
the exploitative practices of the institution, the NCAA has been compelled
to modify its rules to ensure fairness for student-athletes.199 A number of
ideas have been proposed for modernizing college athletics. This
Comment examines three.

1. Free Market
a.

How it Would Work

        ! 
athlete compensation would be eliminated. With a free market approach,
     athletes must be enrolled at the school and in good academic standing
when practicing with an NCAA-sanctioned team or playing in an NCAA    200 In other words, student-athletes would be treated like
all other students. If a school wanted to pay players a market rate, it could.
If a booster wanted to buy a player a car or contribute to his salary, he
could.201 The idea behind the free market model is to make the NCAA
honest. Athletes that generate wealth would be properly compensated.202

197

Id.
Id.
199
See id.
200
David French, An Open Letter to Conservatives about the NCAA, NAT!L REV. (Sep.
29, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/09/ncaa-college-sports-reform-studentathletes-free-market-incentives/.
201
Id.
202
Id.
198
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Pros

Fairness motivates rule makers, the NCAA, and state legislative
bodies to consider granting college athletes access to the marketplace.
              
skills to earn a living while in school, but athletes cannot.203 If athletes are
paid, they would lose their scholarships and be banned from competing in
collegiate athletics, likely forcing many of them to drop out of school.204
Despite the fact that their skills generate billions of dollars each year for
their schools, the NCAA, corporate sponsors, and television networks,
athletes continue to be treated this way.205
                   
prohibiting athletes from accessing the marketplace is unfair.206 This
prac                         
system that people should be permitted to receive pay for their hard work
and talent.207 Athletes could be fairly compensated for what they
contribute to their school and the NCAA by negotiating endorsement
agreements and being paid salaries by donors.208
While courts and the NCAA continue to prohibit athletes from
accessing the market, states have started proposing legislation that would
    -competitive rules and grant athletes the right to
participate in the free market, like other college students can.209 California
recently passed Senate Bill 206, the Fair Pay to Play Act.210 Similar
legislation was proposed in Colorado and a bipartisan bill was introduced
by Congress.211 As states continue passing laws giving athletes the right to
profit from their name, image, and likeness, the NCAA may be forced to
adjust its rules to remain afloat. Allowing access to the marketplace is a
solution.

c.

Cons

At this point in time, the cons of the free market idea may outweigh
the pros for a few reasons. In Alston, the lower court asserted that the
distinction between college and professional sports primarily lies in
203

Nancy Skinner & Scott Wilk, College athletes deserve access to the marketplace, THE
ORANGE CNTY. REG. (June 2, 2019), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/06/02/collegeathletes-deserve-access-to-the-marketplace/.
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student-athletes not receiving unlimited cash payments.212 It is possible
th                 
since athletes would inevitably receive cash payments from agents,
businesses, and schools for their services. Under this type of model,
recruiting would become a competitive bidding process. With no limits on
what schools could provide, donors would contribute more to recruiting,
and schools and coaches would dive into these funds to make the best
offers to talented prospects. In addition, athletes could sign endorsement
deals and be paid salaries by their universities. If this were to occur, the
distinction noted by the lower court in Alston would be destroyed. It
remains to be seen whether this would have an adverse effect on consumer
demand, however, the NCAA has noted that this is a massive concern.
Significantly, the free market could also harm college athletics since
only big schools with rich donors that generate significant revenues from
ticket and merchandise sales and publicity could compete for the best
players. In other words, the free market could put schools which cannot
              
college football and basketball are already dominated by the schools that
recruit the best players. Each year, the same ten or so college football
teams have top-rated recruiting classes, and the same six  Alabama, LSU,
Georgia, Oklahoma, Ohio State, and Clemson  typically compete for
spots in the College Football Playoff. This is also observed in college
basketball, where teams that recruit the best players  Duke, Kansas, North
Carolina, Kentucky, and Michigan State  regularly compete for
conference championships and #1 and #2 seeds in the NCAA Tournament.
If athletes were given access to the market, the best recruits would likely
still choose to attend the schools that recruit the best players now, since
only those schools could generate enough revenue to compete for these
             
can be shown that unlimited payments to student-athletes would not have
a significant impact on demand. Modernization and incremental
adjustments to rules may be required before this can become a reality.

2. Universal Stipends for Athletes
The NCAA could solve its problem with athlete compensation by
allowing schools to provide stipends to all athletes, regardless of the
amount in revenue they generate for the school.213 The payments would be
212

In re Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
213
Jonathan Chait, How to Pay College Athletes Without Ruining NCAA Sports,
INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 31, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/how-to-paycollege-athletes-without-ruining-ncaa-sports.html.
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shared equally, on the basis of hours of effort put in.214 Providing universal
stipends to athletes may sound like a reasonable solution to the
compensation issue. Every athlete, whether on the football, basketball, or
tennis team, would be paid equally based on the time they put into their
sport. If the alternative was not receiving a stipend at all, athletes would
support this idea. However, there is a significant problem with universal
stipends that likely prohibits this type of measure from being
implemented: fairness.
For instance, during the 2012-2013 college basketball season,
University of Indiana won twenty-nine games and the Big Ten regular
season title, was a #1 seed in the NCAA Tournament, and advanced to the
Sweet Sixteen.215                
selected as the second overall pick in the 2013 NBA Draft and is still a
starter in the NBA. As a member of the 2012-2013 Indiana team, Oladipo
produced 7.37 wins which, was estimated to be about $737,129 in
revenue.216 Will Sheehey also played for Indiana and contributed 22.3
minutes per game, 9.5 points, and 3.5 rebounds. Sheehey produced 2.42
wins for Indiana, which was estimated to be about $242,386 in revenue.217
If student-athletes were to receive universal stipends, Sheehey and
Oladipo would be compensated equally, based on hours of effort put in.
Although Oladipo generated nearly three times as much revenue for
Indiana as Sheehey, both would be paid the same amount. The universal
stipend becomes an even bigger problem when you consider that walkons, who typically do not play as much as highly rated recruits and in turn
fail to generate as much revenue, would also be paid as much as the best
players.218
The problem with universal stipends is also encountered at the
professional level in the U.S. Soccer Equal Pay lawsuit.219 Female soccer
players earned a $15,000 bonus for the World Cup whereas male players

214
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earned $55,000.220 !('#% ,$!# &"   #% 
%$!##' &% % ! ,$!# &"221 Even though
as a team, the American women have performed better than the men in
recent World Cups, the problem with paying men and women equal
salaries is comparable to paying Sheehey and walk-ons as much as
Oladipo in the Indiana example. Given the concern and difficulty with
implementing a similar measure at the professional level, it is unlikely that
universal stipends will become the norm at the collegiate level soon.

3. Trust Funds: Setting Aside Revenues Until Graduation
Perhaps the most feasible solution for modernizing amateurism while
maintaining consumer demand is setting aside revenues until studentathletes graduate. In 2018, Josh Rosen proposed that the NCAA modernize
amateurism by allowing athletes to profit, after they graduate, from
various revenue opportunities that arise during their college careers.222 The
) %!!$ ,$"#!"!$$* # !&$+%%(!#$(%%
NCAA and acts as an intermediary between the players and potential
endorsers.223   %##) !$   %%,$  $ 
representative. It would negotiate on behalf of athletes with interested
business parties and money earned for name, image, and likeness would
go into a trust that the players can access after they graduate.224
 #!$ ,$"#!"!$*#' &(!& #%! %#%#$ 
national, regional and local agreements. It would then be distributed into
individual player accounts; an NCAA-wide player pool; the NCAA itself;
the clearinghouse; and a general scholarship fund that would funnel
financial aid for academic purposes back into communities that produce
%%%$+225
% % ! % !$ ,$ "#!"!$ )  % $%  $ !
modernizing amateurism. The proposal is fair to athletes since it affords
them revenue seeking opportunities that are not currently allowed under
NCAA rules. In addition, it is ideal for the NCAA; if athletes do not profit
220
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from revenue opportunities until after graduation, amateurism is
preserved. Furthermore, everybody would benefit from revenue being
distributed to a player pool, the NCAA itself, and a scholarship fund that
could incentivize prospects to attend college.
                
means of modernizing amateurism, it could be improved by removing the
stipulation that athletes graduate from college to access revenues. While
    -athletes to earn their degrees  which
benefits both athletes and universities in the long-run  graduating is not a
feasible means for many elite athletes. Some athletes who play football or
basketball in college come from low-income neighborhoods, and playing
sports professionally affords them the opportunity to provide for their
families. Moreover, an underclassman, or a student-athlete who has played
three seasons of college football and is projected first-round pick in the
NBA or NFL Draft, is not incentivized to stay in school given the prospect
of injury, which could preclude him from signing a guaranteed
              
requirement, and giving players who generate significant revenues for
their schools226 access to that revenue after they leave school, may be a
more feasible means of resolving the problem with student-athlete
compensation.

C.

      

Although each of the proposed solutions would increase the benefits
available to student-athletes, the ability of colleges to pay athletes more
than the grant-in-aid poses an unavoidable Title IX issue. Title IX refers
to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits
colleges that receive federal funding from discriminating on the basis of
sex.227 Since nearly every college receives federal financial assistance,
226
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played only fifty-three minutes during the 2017-18 season, Missouri collected
$5,287,785.15 in total revenue from the season, a 70.9 percent increase from the previous
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Title IX is almost always applicable.228 Title IX surfaces in intercollegiate
athletics in a number of ways, and its purpose is to hold colleges
accountable for failing to rectify sexually antagonistic environments.229
Specifically, Title IX requires college athletic programs to provide roughly
equal opportunities to male and female student-athletes.230
First off, each of the proposed solutions invites Title IX challenges
               whether in
scholarship dollars, trust disbursements, or cash stipends  in amounts that
        hat a school
has violated with Title IX. However, a school does not automatically fail
to comply with Title IX simply by paying male athletes more.231 In the
context of scholarships higher than grant-in-aid, the relevant analysis is
complex and requires a closer look at the extent of disparity between
scholarship values at an institution.232 Title IX does not necessarily require
identical treatment of male and female athletes, nor does it stipulate that
the same amount of money must be spent on both.233 Instead, the relevant
inquiry is whether a school provides substantially equal opportunities to
athletes of both genders.234
Allowing a college student-athlete to make money from the use of his
or her name, image and likeness          is a
proposal that has seen support from nearly every area of the country.
However, it may pose a unique challenge to Title IX for many reasons.
Although some have dismissed Title IX as a nonissue since payments
would be made directly from third parties to athletes, legal experts have
argued that an additional analysis is required before these payments are
dismissed.235 Specifically, experts have asserted that an approval process
requiring university involvement when student athletes engage with third
parties may be necessary.236 Thus, to comply with Title IX, universities
may be obligated to ensure there are equal opportunities for male and
female athletes to interact with sponsors.237
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Significantly, Title IX may also pose an issue to the athletic budgets
of Division I universities.238 Since name, image, and likeness payments
would come from third parties, the financial impact on budgets is nil. 239
However, there is not an infinite supply out there, both in terms of
universities budgeting for additional payments to student-athletes and
third parties making name, image, and likeness payments. It is possible,
perhaps likely, that every payment made from a car dealer, booster,
institutional employee, or trustee to a student-athlete will be one less
donated to universities. And if universities see less money from the
outside, they may be forced to cut the budgets of sports not making any
    
substantially less revenue.
Legislation expanding the ability of universities and third parties to
pay student-athletes may also result in universities wanting to compensate
athletes based on performance. For instance, what if a university endorsed
a policy where male basketball players would be paid individually for
double-doubles or all players on a team would be compensated based on
conference and NCAA Tournament victories? Further, what if universities
offered a significant sum for a male athlete of the year award? Because of
Title IX, schools would be required to make substantially similar offerings
        
athletic budget thin; as discussed, there is not infinite supply out there, and
if universities are not careful, there could be detrimental results.
Since Title IX is a significant obstacle in the way of any of the
proposed solutions, changes to college athletics will depend greatly on
what new legislation looks like and the ideas conferences propose.
Ultimately, legislation and solutions will have to be interpreted by courts
and the Office of Civil Rights. Thus, even though  , Alston, and
proposed legislation in states point to significant modifications to
scholarship agreements and benefits available to athletes in the future, it is
extremely likely that change will be incremental. Because of Title IX, new
policies will have to be specifically tailored to comply with corresponding
rules. Moreover, since payments in what may not seem like excess
amounts may pose a significant problem      
schools must slowly and carefully enact new policies for the benefit of
student-athletes to avoid negative results.
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CONCLUSION

As student-athletes continue to bring antitrust challenges against
NCAA rules, courts will be forced to make decisions that may result in the
#"  !  %   !" !  "  
presumed illegality of scholarship agreements requires the evolution of
rules, further modification of the rules will come at a cost, and a significant
question that judges will be forced to answer is whether the cost is worth
it. In many ways, the tradition of collegiate athletics that currently exists
is special. Fans and alumni at some schools live and die for their football
and basketball programs. They attend home and away games, cherish
magical runs in the NCAA Tournament, and chew their nails during close
games against rivals. However, in areas of the country where stadiums are
empty on game days, fans and alumni contend that the tradition is dying
and in need of a shock to revive interest. Considering recent court
decisions and legislation like that passed in California, the modernization
of NCAA rules is likely to continue. What remains to be seen is how much
more change courts are willing to allow to protect the rights of studentathletes while still seeking to preserve the traditions of intercollegiate
athletics as they existed in the past.
Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or
present are certain the miss the future.240
- President John F. Kennedy
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